INTRODUCTION
Civil society actors, institutions, and organizations distinct from the state and private businesses 1 exert powerful influence on a state's implementation of international human rights law. 2 However, previous research on this topic has overlooked how local civil society actors are able to implement international law on the local level. While previous research acknowledges the role that civil society actors play in supporting human rights, it generally focuses on activity at the national level. This paper argues that the influential role that civil society organizations (CSOs) play in supporting the implementation of international human rights also takes place at the local level, with grassroots organizations demanding changes from local governments on the basis of international law. This is supported by a case study on women's rights legislation in Davao City, Philippines, where local CSOs were the catalyst for the implementation of the Women and Development Code 3 , a wide-reaching piece of legislation affirming women's rights within the city. The Women and Development Code directly implemented the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), known as the "international bill of rights for women," outlining all forms of women's social, economic, and political rights. 4 Remarkably, this code was passed and implemented in the city more than a decade before similar legislation was passed on the national level.
This paper provides evidence that local CSOs can leverage international law to demand changes at the local level and suggests that unique social and political characteristics in the Philippines supported local activism. The Philippines boasts a vibrant civil society with wide public support and participation, 5 which research shows is the single most important factor determining a state's implementation of international human rights, especially women's rights. 6 The Philippines' history of internal conflict and political instability also provides the basis for human rights activity on the local level. This paper will detail how local CSOs in Davao City were able to accomplish implementation in the context of emerging democratic rule and within a deeply divided society, and will provide supporting evidence from interviews recorded in September 2015.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Because the implementation of international human rights law is traditionally considered to be the purview of national governments, 7 much of the literature focuses on its successes and failures at the state level. Empirical research has found that democratization and human rights ratification are related, 8 but are "most effective in stable or consolidating democracies." 9 This is in line with the Philippines' experience after the 1986 ousting of autocratic leader Ferdinand Marcos, which jumpstarted the flourishing of social, political, civil, and other human rights.
However, there is a lack of consensus in the literature; others found that all states make human rights obligations as "window dressing" 10 and that human rights treaties have no effect on the states considered to be the "most terrible repressors." 11 Repressive states ratify human rights treaties as much as non-repressive states, calling into question what motivates states to sign human rights treaties in the first place. 12 Research has found that international human rights treaties have the greatest effect when local citizens demand compliance. 13 This suggests a missing factor in cross-national research on the implementation of human rights; and autonomous domestic women's organizations is the most significant factor accounting for changes in national laws on violence against women, more significant than the existence of leftist parties, the percentage of women in government, or GDP. 14 This work is meaningful because it reinforces the idea that local organizations are at the center of progress on human rights in diverse contexts, and, specific to women's rights, have significant impacts by "[legitimatizing] women's demands at the domestic level for freedom from violence." 15 CSOs are "integral to creating the political salience of human rights." 16 The literature on this topic frequently employs the example of the involvement of CSOs in women's rights activity worldwide. 17 Perhaps more than any other human rights issue, CSOs are fundamental to identification, expansion, and monitoring of women's rights. The book Activists Beyond Borders describes how transnational and local women's organizations have increased international attention toward violence against women, leading to specific policy changes at the state level, as one example of its argument on how transnational advocacy networks advance human rights globally. 18 Other research focused on how "women's organizations succeeded in placing front and center on the UN agenda two issues that had been perceived as exclusively private: violence against women and reproductive health and rights, " as an example of civil society's ability to influence the international political agenda, and subsequently state behavior. 19 The process by which CSOs influence policy change reveals how CSOs operate between national governments, the international community, and human rights. Research examining the role of CSOs in the policy-making process has resulted in a number of different theories and models. 20 Of particular relevance to this case study, the "spiral model" This process has important implications for the implementation of international human rights, and particularly for women's rights. First, it suggests that international law can be implemented on the local level without legislation on the national level. The typical approach to international law implementation assumes that states implement international law nationally prior to activity at the local level. 23 The
Davao City example suggests that there can be multiple pathways for the implementation of international law, including pathways where action on the local level precedes national action. This is significant because it expands the number of relevant actors in human rights discourse and opens future research to examining activity on the sub-state level.
Second, this example reveals social and political factors that may facilitate local CSO activity on implementation of international human rights. In deeply divided societies like the Philippines, where "violence or the threat of violence keeps it divided" 24 and distrust falls along a center-periphery divide, 25 the ability of the national government to effectively govern human rights is compromised by a number of social and political realities. Interviews with local organizations provided evidence of this, with some expressing distrust or ambivalence when asked about their relationship with the national government. As a result, organizations, especially if located in conflict-affected areas, are less prone to demand changes from the national government and instead opt to demand changes from the 
POLITICS, VIOLENCE, AND STRENGTHENING CSOs IN THE PHILIPPINES
It is valuable to cover the development of women's rights throughout the 1990s and early women's organizations, indigenous groups, and others, 32 and helped to create a surge of public support for CSOs.
Even today, data from the Civil Society Index assessment of the Philippines shows that an estimated 75% of the Philippine population participates in CSOs and 50% consider themselves actively involved. 33 The OEF Research and Inclusive Security interview data confirm the perception of a vibrant and active civil society in the Philippines. local CSOs responded with general indifference and suggestions that the national government should interact more directly with communities in Mindanao. 40 In contrast, reported interactions with local government were more positive, with one interviewee suggesting that "action should be at the local government level." 41 In this context, local government benefitted from directly connecting and engaging with communities on a grassroots level, further supporting CSOs as being a legitimate venue for political representation in the city.
Furthermore, the end of the Marcos regime nationally was shortly followed by Rodrigo Duterte's first term as mayor of Davao City in 1988. Now president of the Philippines, Duterte held three separate terms, two consecutive and one non-consecutive, as mayor of Davao City before winning the presidential election in 2016. His tenure marked a departure from those of previous mayors in the city; namely, he asserted far greater control over city affairs.
Many in Davao City credit Duterte with taking a strong and heavy-handed stand against crime and lawlessness and contributing to the wide perception that the city was becoming safer and more economically prosperous. 42 The New York Times reported in early 2017 that Duterte built "a clean and efficient city by Philippine standards," and noted that by the time he left for the presidency in 2016, "the city had drinkable tap water and approved business permits within 72 hours." 43 Yet, in 2002, Time magazine coined Duterte "The Punisher" for his ruthless tactics. 44 The article describes the peace and stability achieved under Duterte as coming "at a grim price," and charged Duterte with "disregarding due process and anointing himself legislator, judge, jury-and possibly executioner-all at once." 45 Stories of the Davao Death Squad (DDS)-also known locally as the "Duterte Death Squad"-abound, alleging that members targeted suspected criminals involved in crimes ranging from petty theft to drug smuggling and selling. 46 Paired with an emboldened civil society following the end of the Marcos regime and the newly strengthened political control assumed by Duterte in Davao City, local CSOs capitalized on an opportunity to advocate for improved laws and policies on women's rights based on CEDAW. On the national level, the Philippines signed CEDAW in 1980 but was unable to pass national legislation on women's rights until the early 1990s. This includes the Women in Development and Nation Building Act in 1993 (RA 7192), 47 the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (RA 8353), 48 
LOCAL CSOs AND DAVAO CITY'S WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT CODE
Beginning in approximately 1995, local CSOs initiated the campaign to create and pass the Women and Development
Code. 53 When asked what influenced their work, local CSOs directly referenced CEDAW, saying, "We use it heavily.
We invoke it." 54 
Particularly important is the code's formal inclusion of local CSOs in governance institutions
in the city, formalizing these organization's monitoring and problem-solving capacity.
In the years following its implementation, the activities organized around the code resulted in some successes. The
University Research Council at Ateneo de Davao reported involvement in gender sensitivity training with local police throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and noted that this was a "civilian initiative." 64 In 1998, Davao City opened its first "Child-Minding Center" for children of government employees. This center directly fulfilled a mandate from the code to provide "basic services and facilities" for families, and signaled the government's commitment to the code. 65 However, despite these successes, the code was not fully operationalized until 2003. When the code was first passed in 1997, it included a requirement that the related interim body scale its size to 99 employees before it could be considered an officially sanctioned government office. While this interim body existed after 1997, it was unable to scale up and, as result, no government office was mandated to oversee, monitor, and ensure its full implementation and compliance; it was local CSOs who were at the center of the campaign to fully implement the code. 
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The IGDD attributes their achievements to the strong women's movement in the city. 67 The division maintains its relationship with local CSOs through a variety of policies and programs including the annual Women's Summit, which was mentioned in many interviews. Every year, the division runs this event with local groups to discuss issues affecting women in Davao City, and aims to prioritize policies and programs for the city to implement. This finding questions the orthodoxy by which states sign and implement international human rights treaties. As evidenced by the language of most international treaties, the state is viewed as the sole provider and protector of human rights and any activity around human rights implementation should necessarily involve the state. Despite this, many states have a mixed record on human rights, even when they sign international human rights treaties. 
